Item Code: IDD195by P.K. MohapatraHardcover (Edition: 2000)Decent Books ISBN 8186921087 Language: English Size: 8.8" X 5.8" Pages: 308 |
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One of the most discussed of current topics in Philosophy of Mind is the problem of personal identity-the problem of what, if any thing, makes a later person the same person as an earlier person. The book is a rare attempt to analyse the problem in its various aspects and develop a theory by way of answering the questions involved. It divides itself into three parts dealings with (1) the nature and source of the problem; (2) how it has bee approached by various philosophers, traditional and contemporary; and (3) what a proper analysis of it will amount to. The theory that eventually issues out of this analysis that bodily continuity is the primary a criterion of personal identity and the claim of memory as the sole, or even primary, criterion is definitively disallowed. The ideas of disembodied existence and survival, which imply and rest upon the primacy of the memory criterion are shown to be what they are i.e. intelligible only in a secondary sense.
Of special interest to philosophers is the finding that the problem at issue is a problem of criterion and not of defining personal identity and also an interesting and original trichotomy between definition, criterion and necessary condition.
From the Back of the Book
Dr. Mohapatra gives a through survey of the philosophical literature, and a firm defence of his own theory that bodily continuity is the primary criterion of personal identity.
R.G. Swinburne
Oxford University, England
Solid achievement. Its particular distinctive contribution is the concern with meta-philosophical issues and an interesting and fertile trichotomy between definition, criterion and necessary condition. Mohapatra's survey of the field is broad and painstaking. His criticisms are to the point and help to buttress his own positive thesis.
Brian J. Smart
University of Keele, England
A significant contribution in the field of Philosophy of Mind. The Author makes careful survey of the relevant literature. His analysis of the problem is penetrating and thoroughgoing. The book I am sure, is going to be immensely useful to students, teachers and thoroughgoing. The book, I am sure, and researcher in the field.
G.C. Nayak
Utkal University, India
About the Author
He got his PhD from the University of Keele, England where he worked as a Commonwealth Scholar during 1974-77 and had been to the United State as a Fulbright Visiting Professor in 1989. A specialist in Philosophy and Mind and Philosophy of Values, he has authored two books, entitled personal identity and Concepts and Problems, edited five books and published a number of articles. He has been the President of the Metaphysics Section of the Indian Philosophy Congress in 1983 and also the General president of the All Orissa Philosophy Association in 1998.
Currently he is the Senior most Professor of Philosophy at Utkal University and the General Editor of Utkal Studies in philosophy series.
| Foreword | vii | |
| Preface | ix | |
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| 1 | INTRODUCTION | |
| 1. The Problem | 3 | |
| 2. A Special Problem | 28 | |
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| 2 | THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH | |
| 1. Locke and Hume: The Memory Theorists | 62 | |
| 2. Butler and Reid: The Intuitionists | 75 | |
| 3. Kant and Willian James | 87 | |
| 3 | THE CONTEMPORARY APPROACH | |
| 1. Criterion | 105 | |
| 2. Bernard Willians: Bodily Continuity | 117 | |
| 3. Shoemaker and Wiggins: A Preference and a Qualification | 145 | |
| 4. Dered Parfit: Memory with a Difference | 175 | |
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| 4 | THE TWO CRITERIA | |
| 1. Bodily continuity Re-examined | 199 | |
| 2. Memory: Not an Independent Criterion | 211 | |
| 3. Disembodied Persons | 227 | |
| 4. More about Disembodied persons | 245 | |
| 5 | CONCLUDING ESTIMATE | |
| 1. Conflict of Criteria and the Relevance of Problem Cases | 265 | |
| 2. Must there be an Answer? Importance of Personal Identity | 279 | |
| Appendix I | 297 | |
| Appendix II | 300 | |
| Index | 305 |