The Problem of Universals in Indian Philosophy

From the Jacket

Raja Ram Dravid presents a comprehensive and critical study of the fundamental problem of universals in Indian Philosophy. The center of the study is the controversy between the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Mimamsa realists on the one hand and the Buddhist nominalists on the other.

The author discusses not only the epistemological and metaphysical approach to the problem of universals but also the semantic approach made by the various systems of Indian Philosophy. In this context the view of the Grammarions with special reference to Bhartrhari has been discussed in some detail. A brief but critical analysis of some of the main trends of thought on universals in Western Philosophy - beginning from Pluto to the contemporary philosophers - has also been given. Besides his scholarly and eminently readable treatment of the fundamental problem of universals, the author has attempted to give his own solution of the problem. It is based on the recurrent identities and similarities which are the principles of grouping and which form the foundation of our thought and speech.

About the Author

Raja ram Dravid taught philosophy at Banaras Hindu University. He had contributed several research papers on various aspects of Indian Philosophy in reputed journals, before he died in harness.

Kanshi Ram teaches Sanskrit at Hans Raj Collage, University of Delhi, Delhi

Contents:

FOREWORD

PREFACE

ABBREVIATIONS

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Chapter II

THE EXTREME REALISM OF THE NYAYA-VAISESIKA 
1. The definition of the universal (jati)
2. The universal as distinct from the particular
3. Universal as the determinant of causality
4. Jati and Upadhi
5. Existence as the Highest Universal
6. Existence versus Being and Reality
7. Criticism of the Nyaya view of 'existence' by other schools
8. Concluding remarks

Chapter III

THE REALISM OF THE MIMAMSA
1. Kumarila's Theory of universals
2. The relation between universal and particular
3. Criticism of the Nyaya view
4. The Prabhakara view of universals
5. Criticism of Kumarila's view
6. Concluding remarks

Chapter IV

THE BUDDHIST CRITICISM OF REALISM AND THE REALIST REPLY

I. The Buddhist Criticism
1. Universal a thought-construction
2. Refutation of the realist theory of general congnition
3. Difficulties in the realist theory of universals
4. The Buddhist explanation of recognition

II. The Realist Reply
1. Universals are real entities
2. General cognitions imply universals
3. Difficulties raised by the Buddhist answered
4. Concluding remarks

Chapter V

ARE UNIVERSALS PERCEIVED ?

I. The Buddhist Position
1. The Realist's view of Perception
2. The Buddhist view of Perception
3. The universal not a percept
4. Determinate cognition not perceptual

II. The Realist's Criticism
1. Universal a perceived fact
2. Determinate cognition perceptual
3. refutation of the Buddhist arguments for momentariness
4. Some more objections answered
5. Defence of substance-attribute relation
6. Concluding remarks

Chapter VI

THE JAINA THEORY OF UNIVERSALS
1. The nature of the object of knowledge
2. Identity of Existence
3. Arguments for the reality of the universals
4. The two kinds of universals
5. Criticism of the Buddhist and the Nyaya views
6. The Jaina conception of the universal
7. Comparison with the Visistadvaita view
8. Concluding remarks

Chapter VII

THE ADVAITA VIEW OF UNIVERSALS
1. The universal Existence and the empirical particular
2. Criticism of the realist theory of universals
3. The Advaitic explanation of general cognition
4. Concluding remarks

Chapter VIII

IMPORT OF WORDS
1. The Individualist theory
2. The Configuration theory
3. The Universalist theory
4. The Theory of Composite denotation
5. The Advaitic criticism of the realist theory of meaning
6. The Advaitic theory of import of words

Chapter IX

THE GRAMMARIAN'S VIEW OF WORD AND MEANING
1. The word as the Ultimate Reality
2. The sentence as universal
3. The word as universal
4. Import of words
5. Bhartrhari's view
6. The theory of superimposition
7. All words denote universals
8. Justification from the Advaitic stand-point
9. An account of the nature of universals
10. A defence of the existence of universals
11. Concluding remarks

Chapter X

THE BUDDHIST NOMINALISM (APOHAVADA)-I

I. The Theory of Dignaga and Dharmakirti
1. Concepts or universals are thought-constructions
2. Words signify mere negations
3. All distinctions are purely conceptual
4. Criticism of the realist theory of meaning

II. Criticism by Kumarila and Uddyotakara

III. Defence of Apohavada by Santaraksita
1. The meaning of apoha
2. Import of words explained
3. Objections of Kumarila answered

IV. Vacaspati Misra's Criticism of Apohavada

Chapter XI

THE BUDDHIST NOMINALISM (APOHAVADA)-II

I. Defence of Apohavada by Jnanasri and Ratnakirti
1. The import of words
2. The objects of perception and conception distinguished
3. Judgments empirically refer to real external things

II. Udayana's Criticism of Apohavada
1. Negation not a felt element in conceptual cognition
2. The object of conceptual cognition not unreal
3. Volitional activity not explained
4. Concluding remarks

Chapter XII

UNIVERSALS IN GREEK AND MEDIEVAL THOUGHT
1. The Extreme Realism of Plato
2. The Moderate Realism of Aristotle
3. The Controversy over Universals in the Middle Ages
    (i) Porphyry's Problem
   (ii) Extreme Realism
  (iii) Adversaries of Extreme Realism
  (iv) Moderate Realism
   (v) Conceptualism

Chapter XIII

CONTRIBUTION OF MODERN THINKERS
1. Hobbes' Nominalism
2. The Conceptualism of Locke
3. Berkeley's Criticism
4. Hume's Theory of Disposition and Resemblance
5. The Rationalist Protest

Chapter XIV

UNIVERSALS VERSUS RESEMBLANCES IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
1. Russell's Defence of Universals
2. The Theory of Stout
3. Moore's Analysis
4. The Protagonists of Resemblance
5. Concluding remarks

Chapter XV

CONCLUSION

A SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY

INDEX