Riddle of Vyapti

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All living-beings are incessantly going forward in scarch of the accurate knowledge with regard to the absolute truth. So, the 'knowledge' is the central desired subject-matter of our life. There are different ways of gaining the accurate knowledge namely, perception, inference, verbal testimoni etc. Most of the things are knowledgeable to us in terms of 'inference' (`anumana'). Because, it is not always possible for us to perceive all the things of every time and place. Again, it is also not possible for us to gain the knowledge by listening to the utterance of the reliable persons. But, We may gain the knowledge most of the things of the world by dint of 'inference' (`anumana') So, `inference' is the very important procodure for gaining knowledge. `Invariable Concommitance rule' (`vyapti') is the first stepping stone for gaining the inferential cognition (`anumiti').

We know that, 'invariable concommitance cognition' (vyaptijnana) is the base of inference so, it is necessary to know about the nature of 'inferential' cognition' (anumitijnana) in the case of discussion about vyaptijnana' . In this connection, we will discuss this matter.

`Inferential cognition (anumitijnana) is a kind of cognition accepted by the Naiyayikas which is originated after another cognition. `Miti' means 'cognition' (Jnana') and 'anu' means 'after'. The term 'anumiti' is defined by the Naiyayikas as such 'Vyapti'

The ultimate subject matter of this percent book is Nyapti'. We know that, the Naiyayikas present their argumentative conclusions in a very delicately investigable procedure of 'introduction' (`uddesa'), `definition' (`laksana') and 'proper evidence' (`pariksa'). Actully, that congnition is called 'anumiti' which is a relation between the inferential subject (paksa) and that probans (hetu) which is specified by Vyapti' or 'invariable concommitance'.

In this connection, we have to know about some technical terms as such : 'paksa' (inferential subject), `sadhya' (probandum), 'hetu' (probans) and so on. The knower is going forward to infer in connection with which object that is called 'sadhya' (probandum). The knower is doubtful about the existence of probandum in which place that doubtful place is called 'paksa' (inferential subject). Besides this kind of doubtfulness, it would not be possible for the knower becomes desirous to gain the inferential cognition. The helping entity is called `hetu' (probans) by which the knower can prove the existence of the probandum in the inferential subject. It is necessary to discuss about the procedure of gaining the inferential congnition in this connection.

Suppose, the knower will try to prove the existence of the fire in the hill. At first, the knower has to gain the invariable concommitance cognition (vyaptijnana) between the smoke and fire in this matter. Such perceptual cognition is the base of any kind of inferential cognition (anumiti). After that, the knower will go near a hill. He saw that, the smoke is going forth from that hill. This type of cognition is technically known as paksadharmatajnana' in Nyaya philosophy. Then the knower will remember about that invariable concommitance congnition (vyaptijnana) between the probans and probandum previously known. It is a kind of memorial cognition. It is known as 'invariable concommitance memorial cognition' (`Vyapti' smrti). After that, the knower may understand that, this hill is specified by the invariable concomnitance (`Vyapti') between the smoke and the fire. It is technically known as `paramarsajnana' in Nyaya philosophical thought. After that, the knower gains the 'inferential cognition' (anumitijnana) like 'the hill is full of fire'.

Suppose, the knower will prove the existence of the fire in the hill. At first, the knower has to gain the invariable concommitance cognition Following the above mentioned systematic procedure of comprehending arguments given by the Naiyayikas, the book is mainly divided into two chapters : (I). Introduction (`uddesa') and (II). Definitions of 'Vyapti' and its critical discussion (`laksana' and `pariksa '). The second chapter is divided into three parts. Vyaptipancaka of Gangesa Upadhyay has been translated in English in the first part of the second chapter of this present book. After that, Vyaptipancaka-rahasya of Mathuranatha Tarkavagisa has been translated in English in the second part of this chapter. Didhili of Raghunatha Siromoni has been translated into both by Bengali and English by the present author at the end of the second chapter of this book.

Some acaryas before Gangesa gave the various five-fold definitions of `Vyapti'. Gangesa Upadhyay, founder of Navya-Nyaya demonstrated those five-fold definitions of `Vyapti' in his book Tattvacintamani. Refuting those five-fold definitions, Gangesa gave a new or final definition of `Vyapti' which is known as "Siddhanta Laksana.' Gangesa demonstrated those five-fold definitions in his Vyaptipancaka which is a part of Vyaptivada. Vyaptivada is the second chapter of Anumanacintamani. This Anumanacintamani is the second part of the book Tattvacintamani There are many commentaries on the book named Vyaptipancaka with an eye to its clarification. These are : Didhiti of Raghunatha Siromoni. Vyaptipancaka-rahasya of Mathurana -tha Tarkavagisa, Jagadisi of Jagadisa Tarkalamkara etc.

The ultimate aim of the present author is to translate Vyaptipancaka and its commentary named Vyaptipancaka-rahasya in English in a nutshell. Apart from this, Didhiti has been translated both in Bengali and English.

I have great pleasure in going through some of portions of Rupa's work. Though it is a translation of the original work, Rupa's venture is commendable. Vyaptipancaka is a difficult text, not easy to understand for it is full of intricacies and subtle arguments. Gangesa criticised these several definitions of vyapti one after another. The second one is an improvement of the first one which appears as satisfactory at first. But critical reflection points to the deficiencies and shortcomings of this definition which compels the author to offer an alternative definition of vyapti. But the second definition also suffers from the same fate as the first one and needs to be changed. In this way, Gangesa accomodates the third, fourth and fifth definitions to rectify the defects occuring in the earlier definitions. Going through these elaborate processes of analysing and rejecting Gangesa finally came to realize that none of these definitions could be acceptable on the ground that none of them had any relevance in the case of kevalanvayi sadhya. The original work together with the commentary by Mathuranath from part and parcel of Rupa's work. It goes without saying that faithful presentation of arguments and counter-arguments is not at all easy. It goes to the credit of Rupa that she ventured to keep her footsteps where many would not be inclined to tread. I wish her all success in her endeavour and bless her to go forward to fulfil the long-standing demands of students who want to enter into Sanskrit Text through the medium of English. Her attempt is certainly a move in the right direction as there are derath of publications in this respect.

**Contents and Sample Pages**