Mythology and Possibility- The Dual Universe (An Old and Rare Book)

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I HAD the privilege of knowing Basanta Kumar Mallik and of holding discussions with him. I have read his published works with immense profit. His death last December (1958), after a rather painful illness valiantly borne with characteristic resignation, came to his friends and admirers as an irreparable personal loss. It painfully signalised the end of an era of creative thinking which began with the publication of The Real and the Negative (1940). And it is some consolation to know that before his end Mallik could complete Mythology and Possibility, his last worthy testament to us. Mythology and Possibility is a sequel to Non-Absolutes and pre-supposes, almost at every step, the characteristic standpoint so brilliantly expounded in the former volume. The arguments for discarding the Absolute as Illusion, the conception of the Non-Absolutes (non-absolute Being and non-absolute Non-Being), the different stages in their involvement and career, their frustration and fulfilment, all these underlie this book, and are in a sense confirmed and completed by it. While only the possibility of fulfilment was intimated in the Non-Absolutes, Mythology and Possibility carries the argument to its logical conclusion by showing the way to its concrete realisation. Mallik's conception does not envisage the total immediate disappearance or suppression of the opposites or conflicting groups, but only the removal of the tension. To quote his own words: 'Let me for a moment define the Ethics of Abstention. Clearly it is based on the rejection of both the principles taken as opposites in the realm of the Third Stage. There is no room for contradiction, as we have said already, and therefore no room for conflict as the Ethics of Abstention appears. The place of opposition is taken by Abstention, which retires from both opposites on the ground that they are invalid and are no longer workable. The method of abstention works, instead, on the principle of the Non-Absolute. There is no opposition on either side the form Abstention takes as a result of this can best be appreciated from actual experience. As far as I can see the issue is that of not contradicting both the values which caused conflict. These values no longer function; they become incapable of raising a mutual contradiction-they are, in other words, incapable of any fany activity but, as it were, "stand in the way"." (p. 210) Mallik is also quite definite that once the Fourth Stage (the Stage of Fulfilment) is reached, the Third Stage of Conflict and Frustration lapses. 'But there may be phases of the Fourth Stage. As the Fourth Stage can exist alongside the Third Stage, the Third Stage may only gradually disappear; but the centres which have succeeded in reaching the Fourth Stage cannot lapse back into the Third.' (p. 212)

The metaphysic of the Non-Absolutes leads to the Ethics of Abstention as the solution of the world-conflict. This is indeed a fruitful suggestion for the removal of tension and conflict, and deserves to be practised by individuals and groups. Should the last word be Abstention? Could not it be more positive? Could not the Ethics of Abstention itself be but the first spiritual step in the rapprochement of the warring groups, leading eventually to their complete identification? Such an ideal would presuppose a Mystic All-Embracive Reality (the Absolute of Indian Tradition) which underlies the opposites and makes for the various relations which the Non-Absolutes (Being and Non-Being) sustain with each other. This is a metaphysic which the Non-Absolutes has dis-carded, and, in consequence, mutual abstention is the only ideal capable of fulfilment on Mallik's philosophy.

Rather unusual claims have been made, at numerous places, for the originality of this philosophy and the mode of its revelation. It is not necessary to agree with these claims to appreciate the great significance and worth of Mallik's thought. It is also not necessary to examine whether Mallik's philosophy is in line with Indian thought. There are countless references to basic Brāhmanical and Buddhist conceptions; nor is one left with any doubt regarding the personal inclination of the author. But the main principle of Mallik's philosophy, as well as its application, is his own contribution.

Mythology and Possibility, like the three other preceding works, makes difficult reading, owing largely to the subject-matter and to Mallik's peculiar use of technical terms. One is however amply recompensed by the strikingly deep and daring attempt to solve the intimate problems of reality and life.

HEN I had finished laying down my account of the Triadic Universe, the whole of the three volumes of my works, W altogether spontaneous, appeared to me to be a full and complete account of the nature of Reality. Naturally it seemed to me that past accounts or descriptions of Reality, as it was honestly conceived to be, were fully replaced by my fresh scheme of Reality. My first impression with reference to my scheme of the Triadic Universe was that for the first time it was truly descriptive of Reality. I felt that history no longer held claim to any true significance or had any bearing on Reality. If there was no necessity for history after Reality was found to be triadic-with the First Continuous, the Discontinuous and the Second Continuous Universes-my mind could find no reason any longer for fresh historical research: when Reality had suddenly been discovered, in the course of 1940, in its true proportion, could there be any need for the continuance or reviving of historical investigation? The whole of the past at this point appeared to me to be completely without value or use.

This was my conclusion with reference to history, which, as I saw it, must reflect the same identical, dead state of scepticism: it was my first conclusion after the discovery of the Triadic Universe and it naturally had a bearing on what would be the nature of any enquiry I should make as an historian.

It will perhaps be valuable in this connection if I refer here to the comments on my system, regarded as a 'fresh system of thought', made by two of the greatest Indian metaphysicians-Professor T. R. V. Murti, of Banaras Hindu University, and Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya, of Visva Bharati, at Santineketan -which have a bearing on my conclusion regarding history.

I have a special additional reason for doing so. I feel that these two metaphysicians are outstanding for their specific and distinct capacity for grasp of Truth. No doubt there have been meta-physicians in India noted for their originality and for their depth and honesty, but no metaphysician has ever shown such originality in the interpretation of the Hindu outlook as Professor Murti and Professor Bhattacharyya frankly have done. Theirs is an unusual contribution and performance even in the history of India: nobody else, however great, has ever fully grasped the direct bearing of Hindu thought or its true significance, it may be fairly claimed, as they have. Evidently, it is possible only for a metaphysician of deep Hindu instinct, untouched by non-Hindu characteristics, to come to the conclusion which Professor Murti, for instance, has reached.

I leave it at that perhaps I ought to suggest that no statement can be made at this stage about the comments on my work of the two Hindu metaphysicians. Simple as it may seem to make such comments, they require a great deal of research and it will take a long time for the final opinion of my work to appear.

I may be allowed, however, to make one or two remarks about the two metaphysicians, which will, of course, bear a personal significance. Needless to say, I regard it as my special good fortune, rather late in my life, to have come across two such unusually pure types, both as regards character and intellectual depth. Such types have been rare since we in India lost our independence nearly six centuries ago. It seems to me that the sudden appearance on the scene of two such thinkers as Murti and Bhattacharyya is an evidence that an age of originality in both thought and action is guaranteed to India almost certainly. This is my personal tribute to Professor Murti and Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya.

The next comment I ought to make is about myself and my reactions to the views the two metaphysicians hold about my work. The comments that both Professor Murti and Professor Bhattacharyya have made strike me as being deeply exceptional: and I should be honest enough to add that when I first came to know of them I felt quite unable to say anything about them. Professor Murti's comment, in particular, left me literally speech-less and without a word an altogether new experience in my life. From the moment I saw it I was filled with a deep sense of quiet. Fortunately there are on record instances of such unusual experiences as mine in medieval times so that I am not quite alone in making such a claim.