Is this thesis we have tried to discuss some aspects which in the philosophy of language appear to be important particularly concerning the question: How does a linguistic expression get its life?
We might broadly distinguish three different approaches in philosophy of language the Russellian approach, the later Wittgensteinian approach and the approach via transformational generative grammar. Frege has formulated his doctrine of sense-reference distinction and holds that it is by virtue of the sense, an expression is associated with the reference. So. according to Frege both sense and reference may be regarded as constituting the import of linguistic expressions.
This answer, however, has been rejected by Russell and early Wittgenstein. Rejecting this sense-reference distinction they formulate what may be regarded as a purely referential theory of meaning. And as regards the original question they hold the rival theory that the words mean their objects (which are already before us) just by pointing towards them. But 'how do they point towards the fact? cannot be explained in language.
But Wittgenstein's later objections against this theory reveal the fact that the concept 'meaning' is left unexplained in this formalistic approach. This theory left the problem as an unsolved mystery by considering the relation between fact and words as a mystical one.
In Wittgenstein's later approach we find an emphasis on the context-dependent nature of ordinary language in his attempt to explain 'how does a word mean its object?" He consequently maintains the rival view that meaning can not be divorced from its use. In this theory the original question gets its proper emphasis; and as this question has been of central importance in this use theory of meaning, we have tried to examine this theory with its origin, development and consequences. In this theory it is argued that, it is the 'use' that gives 'life' to the dead sign. And the term 'import', consequently, receives a richer dimension in this theory. It is thus no longer understood in the restricted context of 'constative utterances', where sense and reference are conceived to be the only possible imports. 'Meaning' has been under-stood (in the wider context of performative as well as constative utterances) as associated with the concepts 'force', 'effect', etc., accommodating at the same time (as needed) the previous distinction between sense and reference. Thus, this 'use' theory of meaning becomes the third rival alternative claim to our question. We are here mainly concerned with the later development in the theory of language in which our original question seems to receive its proper solution.
But this too much emphasis on the context dependence of words in ordinary language, this aversion from the formalistic approach leads to a total destruction of theories in general. The irregularities of ordinary language prevent the Wittgensteinians from forming any definite theory of meaning.
Hence gradually it is found that 'use' alone does not suffice to explain 'how does a linguistic expression get its life?"; some other factors besides the use of expressions are to be taken into consideration.
From Grice onwards, philosophers and linguists have sought for this explanatory condition of meaning. In Grice we find emphasis on the notion of utterer's meaning; the subsequent emphasis on the meaning of an utterance has transformed the Gricean emphasis on the factor of intention (as the defining condition of meaning) into the emphasis on the factor of convention (as the determining factor of meaning). This attempt leads the philosophers to the further question concerning rules and structures of language. But all these attempts to formulate the nature of linguistic rules in a satisfactorily adequate manner lead ultimately to the theory of trans-formational generative grammar.
Chomsky's 'innateness hypothesis traces the origin of these rules in the nature of human thought, which constitutes the inherent 'deep structure of language. This belief in a deep structure of language reflects his belief in the systematic nature of language, and as Fodor and Katz rightly maintain, it is a good methodology 'to assume that natural languages are highly systema-tic, even though this assumption may eventually prove false." It is in lacking this assumption that ordinary language philosophy fails to arrive at a satisfactory theory of meaning, in spite of the fact that it has undertaken such a task; for any theoretical orientation it is necessary to suppose that the phenomena under study are governed by general laws. The too much of empiricistic inclination leads these philosophers to a mere compiling of data regarding linguistic usage, and the rules are conceived merely as the constitutive rules. This pure conventionalism, which is the logical outcome of functionalism in its extreme form, fails to account for some of the facts in actual linguistic practice of the community.
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